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ComfyUI-Manager, an extension for ComfyUI, is vulnerable prior to versions 3.39.2 and 4.0.5 to improper neutralization of CRLF characters in HTTP query parameter input. An attacker can supply crafted query parameter values containing special characters, including CRLF sequences, which are then written into config.ini, allowing arbitrary configuration entries to be injected. This enables unauthorized modification of configuration state and application behavior through the configuration handler.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This four-file repository implements an operational network RCE chain against claimed vulnerable ComfyUI-Manager releases. autopwn.py is the primary all-in-one Python exploit: it creates a bare Git repository containing a malicious install.py, hosts it with Python's HTTP server, injects a carriage return into the db_mode configuration value to forge security_level=weak, requests a Manager reboot, polls the Git-install endpoint for a 403-to-400 transition, and submits the hosted repository URL. It can generate either a configurable Python/Bash reverse shell or a blind command payload. exploit.sh implements the same phased chain with curl and expects setup_evil_repo.sh to create and serve the malicious repository on TCP/9099. The latter builds a plausible custom-node repository and embeds a Python socket reverse shell. README.md documents the claimed CVEs, affected versions, setup, validation behavior, and mitigations. A documentation inconsistency refers to exploit_ad15.sh, while the supplied repository contains exploit.sh instead.
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6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.