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Termix (a web-based server management platform) versions 1.7.0 through 1.9.0 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the File Manager component. The FileViewer implementation (src/ui/desktop/apps/file-manager/components/FileViewer.tsx) renders SVG file content without sanitization. An attacker able to place a crafted SVG file into a managed server’s filesystem can cause arbitrary JavaScript to execute in the Termix application context when a Termix user previews the file via the File Manager.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a single Python PoC exploit (exploit.py) plus README and .gitignore. The PoC targets Termix (Electron app) stored XSS in the File Manager’s SVG rendering (unsafe dangerouslySetInnerHTML per README; advisory GHSA-m3cv-5hgp-hv35). Exploit flow: (1) authenticate to Termix backend at http://localhost:30001 (login, else register) and set Authorization: Bearer <token>; (2) enumerate and then create a managed SSH host entry pointing to 127.0.0.1:22 with username 'kali' and key-based auth, generating an RSA keypair at /home/kali/CVE-2026-22804/poc_key and appending the public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys; (3) initiate an SSH session via the file-manager service at http://localhost:30004 and poll /ssh/status; (4) upload cookie_stealer.svg to /home/kali via /ssh/uploadFile. The uploaded SVG embeds HTML/JS via <foreignObject> and triggers execution using an <img onerror> handler; when a user views the SVG in Termix’s File Manager, it reads localStorage and document.cookie and displays them (overlay + alert), demonstrating session hijacking within the Electron context. No external C2/exfil endpoint is used; data is shown locally in the UI.
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