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go-ethereum (geth), a Go implementation of the Ethereum execution layer, contains a denial-of-service vulnerability where a remote attacker can send a specially crafted/malicious P2P network message that triggers a crash or forces the node to shut down. The issue is fixed in go-ethereum 1.16.8.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a single Go proof-of-concept (ecies_exploit.go) plus go.mod/go.sum. The PoC targets CVE-2026-22862 in go-ethereum’s ECIES decryption logic by crafting a ciphertext with: (1) a plaintext attacker ephemeral public key prefix (65 bytes), (2) an intentionally too-short encrypted_message (<16 bytes, violating the required AES IV length), and (3) a correct HMAC-SHA256 tag computed from the derived Km (via a simplified concat-KDF and extra hash step matching geth behavior). It then calls ecies.PrivateKey.Decrypt() and uses a deferred recover() to demonstrate that a panic can be triggered (DoS). No network endpoints, URLs, IPs, domains, file paths, or registry keys are present; all keys are generated in-memory and the exploit is executed locally as a standalone Go program.
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2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.