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A critical vulnerability in the Eigent repository’s GitHub Actions CI workflow (.github/workflows/ci.yml) where the workflow is triggered via pull_request_target and then checks out and executes untrusted code from forked pull requests. Because pull_request_target runs in the context of the base repository (with access to its secrets and token permissions), an attacker can craft a fork PR whose code is executed by the workflow, resulting in arbitrary code execution within the CI runner under the base repo’s security context.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This is not a conventional target-side exploit repository. It is an automated research/lab snapshot of Eigent, explicitly described in README.md as a reproduction artifact for a published GitHub Actions workflow vulnerability. The principal proof-of-concept is .github/workflows/ci.yml: it runs on pull_request_target, then job2 checks out the untrusted pull-request head SHA and runs npx markdownlint-cli. This creates a potentially dangerous privileged CI pattern if PR-controlled checkout content can affect the invoked tooling or dependency resolution. The workflow token has pull-requests: write permission, so a successful CI-context compromise could act on pull requests; no hard-coded shell payload, reverse shell, credential theft, or target-specific destructive action appears in the supplied content. The remaining repository is the Eigent desktop application's Python backend, rather than exploit support code. It exposes FastAPI chat, task, model-validation, tool-installation, health, browser-profile, and cookie-management functions; coordinates CAMEL-based multi-agent workers; and enables optional toolkits for terminal/code execution, filesystem writes, browser automation through local CDP, web search, MCP services, OAuth-enabled Google Calendar/Drive/Gmail, Notion, GitHub, Slack, social networks, media processing, and remote HTML deployment. These are application capabilities that may operate on local user data and configured third-party credentials, not behavior automatically invoked by the GitHub Actions PoC. The supplied snapshot contains primarily Python backend code plus JavaScript debug tooling and CI YAML; the documented normal application server entrypoint references main:api, but its main.py is absent from the provided file inventory.
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