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A flaw in the Linux kernel xHCI (USB 3) sideband endpoint removal path where xhci_sideband_remove_endpoint() incorrectly assumes the endpoint is running and that a valid transfer ring exists. In certain states (e.g., after xHCI reinitialization on resume due to power loss, during device re-enumeration/disconnect, or when an endpoint has already been dropped), the function may dereference a non-existent/freed transfer ring pointer (ep->ring), causing an invalid pointer dereference and crash. The fix removes unnecessary ring access, adds a guard to ensure ep->ring exists before dereferencing, and verifies the endpoint is running before attempting to stop it; it also removes xhci_initialize_ring_info() during sideband endpoint removal to avoid desynchronizing software ring state from hardware.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a minimal Python proof-of-concept demonstrating unauthenticated DICOM image injection, labeled as CVE-2026-23009. It contains two code files: a vulnerable simulated DICOM C-STORE SCP server (dicom_server_sim.py) and a client-side exploit (exploit_dicom_inject.py). The server uses pynetdicom, listens on TCP port 11112 on all interfaces, accepts any incoming C-STORE request without authentication or AE title validation, and writes received datasets to /tmp using the SOPInstanceUID as the filename. The exploit uses pynetdicom and pydicom to establish an association to localhost:11112, request the CT Image Storage presentation context, build a minimal forged Dataset, set attacker-controlled metadata such as PatientName='INJECTED_MALWARE', and send it with assoc.send_c_store(). There is no shellcode, command execution, persistence, or post-exploitation capability; the core capability is unauthorized data injection into a medical imaging workflow. Repository structure is simple: LICENSE, README.md with usage instructions and vulnerability description, and the two Python scripts. Overall, this is a straightforward network-based PoC for integrity compromise of a DICOM/PACS receiver rather than a weaponized exploit.
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2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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