Loading vulnerability…
CVE-2026-23698 is an authenticated remote code execution vulnerability affecting Vtiger CRM through version 8.4.0. The flaw resides in the administrative module import feature, specifically the ModuleManager import function, which accepts a crafted ZIP archive and extracts its contents directly into the web-accessible modules directory under the web root. The import logic does not sufficiently validate uploaded file types beyond the manifest descriptor, allowing an administrator-level attacker to include arbitrary PHP code within the imported module package. Because the extracted PHP content is placed in a location served by the web server, it can be invoked directly over HTTP. This causes code execution to occur through the web server and PHP interpreter before the application’s normal routing, authentication, and authorization controls are applied. The result is persistent server-side code execution, commonly in the form of a web shell, that remains accessible independently of the original authenticated session used to perform the import.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Single-file Python proof-of-concept exploit targeting authenticated remote code execution in Vtiger CRM 8.3.0/8.4.0. The repository contains one executable script, Vtiger-8.4.0-RCE-PoC.py, which uses the requests library to authenticate to a target Vtiger instance, extract CSRF tokens, and then execute one of two upload-based RCE paths. The primary capability is arbitrary command execution via a minimal PHP webshell payload (<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>). In default module mode, the script builds an in-memory ZIP module package containing manifest.xml, a language file, and modules/<random>/shell.php. It uploads this package through the ModuleManager import workflow and installs it, resulting in a persistent shell exposed under /modules/<random>/shell.php. The script explicitly notes this shell is reachable without authentication after installation. In phar mode, the script abuses the Documents module to upload shell.phar, then browses a predictable /storage/<year>/<month>/weekN/ directory listing to locate the generated filename and invoke it with a cmd parameter. This path depends on weaker target configuration: .phar not being blocked, directory listing being enabled, and storage protections being ineffective. Repository structure is minimal and purpose-built: one Python entry-point script with helper functions for CSRF extraction, login, module-based exploitation, PHAR-based exploitation, and CLI argument parsing. There is no framework integration, no detection-only logic, and no cleanup routine. The exploit is operational rather than weaponized: it provides working payload delivery and execution, but payload customization is limited to the command string passed to the embedded PHP shell.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.