CVE-2026-23751 affects Kofax Capture, now Tungsten Capture, including version 6.0.0.0; other versions may also be affected. The Ascent Capture Service exposes a deprecated .NET Remoting HTTP channel on TCP port 2424 that is reachable without authentication and uses a default, publicly known endpoint identifier. This permits an unauthenticated remote attacker to interact with the remoting service and abuse .NET Remoting object unmarshalling behavior to instantiate a remote System.Net.WebClient object. Through that primitive, an attacker can read arbitrary files from the server filesystem, write attacker-controlled files to the server, or trigger outbound authentication to an attacker-controlled host. The issue stems primarily from exposing a sensitive remoting interface without authentication, with the insecure remoting/unmarshalling behavior enabling post-access abuse.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This is a 16-file standalone C#/.NET Framework 4.8 proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-23751 affecting Tungsten Automation Kofax Capture ACService. It is not a Metasploit/Nuclei-style framework module. The Visual Studio solution contains three projects: RemotingClient_MBRO_Lazy (the executable exploit client), Shared (remoting message construction, custom serialization, and URI-rewriting channel sink), and Payload (an installer DLL used for command execution). The client accepts read, write, and exec operations. It registers an HTTP remoting channel and uses a serialized UniversalMarshal object disguised as Lazy<T> in the logical call context of a benign Object.ToString invocation. If the server accepts/deserializes that data, the returned context yields transparent remote instances of arbitrary MarshalByRefObject types, specifically System.Net.WebClient and System.Configuration.Install.AssemblyInstaller. WebClient.DownloadString and UploadData provide file-read and file-write primitives under the Kofax service identity, including paths resolving to UNC/SMB resources. The custom ChannelUriFixingClientChannelSinkProvider rewrites returned remoting object URIs to the originally supplied public target host and port, accommodating servers that advertise unreachable internal channel addresses. For exec, the client reads a local Payload.dll, uploads it to the operator-supplied target path with the remote WebClient, obtains a remote AssemblyInstaller, enables a new install context, sets its Path (causing server-side Assembly.LoadFrom), and invokes Install(null). The included Payload/Payload.cs is an operational but basic hardcoded payload: its installer constructor/Install override executes `whoami` via cmd.exe and records output in C:\Windows\Temp\pwn_out.txt. The client then reads that output through the same remoting primitive. No authentication is implemented or required by the PoC, but exploitability depends on endpoint exposure, the remoting formatter/filter configuration, and service-account file/network privileges.
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