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SandboxJS (the @nyariv/sandboxjs JavaScript sandboxing library) versions prior to 0.8.26 contain a sandbox escape due to incomplete isolation of function constructors. The library replaces the global Function constructor with a sandboxed replacement (SandboxFunction) via a lookup/mapping in utils.ts. However, affected versions do not map AsyncFunction, GeneratorFunction, and AsyncGeneratorFunction. Although these constructors are not exposed as globals, sandboxed code can obtain them through the .constructor property of function instances (e.g., (async () => {}).constructor). In executor.ts, when sandboxed code accesses .constructor on an async function, the executor returns the underlying native host AsyncFunction constructor because it is not present in the safe-replacement map. With access to the host AsyncFunction constructor, an attacker can create new functions that execute in the host global scope rather than the sandbox context, bypassing sandbox restrictions and enabling arbitrary code execution in the host environment. Version 0.8.26 patches the issue by properly isolating/intercepting these constructors in the sandbox mapping.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a small Go-based exploit/payload generator for CVE-2026-23830 (described as a SandboxJS/sandboxjs sandbox escape via an unprotected AsyncFunction constructor). Structure: - CVE-2026-23830.go: single Go CLI that prints a banner and generates a minified JavaScript payload. It supports two modes: - oob: Builds a payload that uses AsyncFunction constructor to escape the sandbox, require Node.js 'child_process' to run an arbitrary command (default: whoami) via execSync, base64-encodes the output, and exfiltrates it to an attacker-supplied listener URL using Node's http/https module (auto-selected based on URL scheme). Network errors are swallowed. - calc: Builds a payload that escapes the sandbox and spawns 'calc.exe' detached (Windows PoC). The tool does not deliver the payload to a target; it only prints it (optionally with -raw). - README.md: usage instructions, claims/features, and mitigation guidance. Overall purpose: generate ready-to-paste JavaScript RCE payloads for environments that evaluate attacker-controlled JS inside vulnerable sandboxjs, enabling host command execution and (in blind scenarios) outbound HTTP/HTTPS exfiltration of command output.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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