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AlchemyCMS (Ruby on Rails) is vulnerable to authenticated remote code execution prior to versions 7.4.12 and 8.0.3 due to use of Ruby eval() on an attacker-influenced string. In app/helpers/alchemy/resources_helper.rb (Alchemy::ResourcesHelper#resource_url_proxy, line 28), the application dynamically executes a string derived from resource_handler.engine_name. The code explicitly suppresses linting with # rubocop:disable Security/Eval. Because engine_name is sourced from module definitions that can be influenced via administrative configuration, an authenticated attacker can inject malicious Ruby into the eval() sink, escaping intended constraints and executing arbitrary system commands on the host OS. The issue is fixed in 7.4.12 and 8.0.3 by replacing eval() with send().
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If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
eval() in Alchemy::ResourcesHelper#resource_url_proxy; strictly validate/allowlist resource_handler.engine_name to known-safe engine identifiers; restrict who can change administrative/module configuration that influences module definitions; harden deployment to prevent modification of module definition/config files (tight file permissions, immutable deployments, and strong access controls).Patch, then assume compromise.
alchemy_cms to 7.4.12+ (7.x line) or 8.0.3+ (8.x line), where the vulnerable eval() usage in Alchemy::ResourcesHelper#resource_url_proxy is replaced with send(). Verify the deployed code no longer evaluates attacker-influenced strings and that the patched versions are running in all environments.No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 1 candidate as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.
All candidate exploits were filtered out by Mallory's validation.
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3 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.