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CVE-2026-23989 is an incorrect authorization vulnerability in the gRPC authorization middleware of the Reva component used by OpenCloud. The middleware fails to properly enforce the scope associated with a public link. An attacker can abuse the archiver service to request a ZIP or TAR archive containing resources outside the intended public-link scope, including all resources accessible to the user who created the public link. Affected releases are those before 2.40.3 and 2.42.3 in their respective release branches.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This is a self-contained Docker-based proof-of-concept and A/B validation lab for CVE-2026-23989, a broken-access-control flaw in OpenCloud/OCIS's Reva gateway public-link scope validation. The vulnerable Reva check treats path containment as a raw string-prefix test (strings.HasPrefix). Consequently, a public link scoped to /Shared can access a same-space sibling such as /Shared-secret because its pathname begins with /Shared, despite not being a child of that directory. The exploit does not provide code execution or persistence; its capability is unauthorized file read/exfiltration as a ZIP archive via GET /archiver?id=<resource-id> and a public-token header. Repository structure: docker-compose.yml runs a deliberately weakened local OpenCloud instance, defaulting to version 4.0.2. setup.sh authenticates as demo user mary, creates /Shared, /Shared-secret, and /Private, uploads test files, obtains resource IDs via WebDAV PROPFIND, creates a public link to /Shared through the OCS sharing API, and writes token/ID data to state.env. exploit.sh is the attacker-facing PoC: it accepts URL, token, and target ID options (or reads state.env), calls the archiver endpoint, verifies ZIP magic bytes, and uses inline Python to display non-empty extracted files. verify.sh performs a clean A/B test: vulnerable 4.0.2 should allow both /Shared and out-of-scope /Shared-secret but deny /Private; after switching to 4.0.3, /Shared remains available and /Shared-secret is denied. patch/reva-scope.go.patch documents the upstream remediation: filepath.Rel replaces the unsafe raw-prefix containment test and rejects paths escaping upward with '..'. The stated fixes are OpenCloud 4.0.3/5.0.2 and Reva 2.40.3/2.42.3.
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