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CVE-2026-24418 is a critical error-based SQL injection vulnerability in OpenSTAManager, an open-source management platform for technical assistance and invoicing. It affects OpenSTAManager v2.9.8 and earlier. The flaw is in the bulk operations handler for the Scadenzario (Payment Schedule) module, where the application fails to validate that elements of the id_records[] array are integers before interpolating them into an SQL IN() clause. An authenticated attacker can supply crafted id_records[] values to inject arbitrary SQL statements. The issue is specifically exploitable as an error-based SQL injection, with database responses leaking query results through XML/XPATH error messages such as those triggered by EXTRACTVALUE or UPDATEXML-style payloads.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
Repository is a small standalone Python exploit project with 3 files: LICENSE, README.md, and a single executable script, exploit.py. The README documents CVE-2026-24418 affecting OpenSTAManager <= 2.9.8, specifically an authenticated error-based SQL injection in the Scadenzario bulk operations flow via POST parameter id_records[] to /actions.php?id_module=18. The exploit is not part of a larger framework. The main code is in exploit.py, a Python CLI tool using requests/urllib3. It establishes an authenticated session either by logging into /index.php with username/password and optional CSRF token extraction, or by accepting a supplied PHPSESSID cookie. It configures browser-like headers, optional proxying, SSL verification disablement, and request throttling. Based on the README and visible code structure, the exploit supports multiple post-auth SQLi operations: server/database fingerprinting (--info), privilege checks (--privs), credential dumping from zz_users (--users), database/table/column enumeration (--dbs/--tables/--columns), arbitrary table dumping (--dump), custom SQL execution (--sql), file reads via LOAD_FILE() (--file-read / --file-read-hex), and attempted webshell upload / interactive RCE (--webshell / --rce). The SQLi payload uses EXTRACTVALUE() error leakage with a ~ marker and chunks long outputs using SUBSTRING() because XPATH error messages are length-limited. This makes the exploit operational rather than a simple detector. The repository also clearly documents limitations: direct INTO DUMPFILE-based webshell upload is often not feasible from this exact error-based injection point because MySQL forbids INTO DUMPFILE in subqueries/IN() contexts, so file-read capabilities are more reliable than code execution unless the attacker can pivot or stacked queries are possible. Overall, this is a genuine authenticated exploitation tool for data extraction and possible host compromise against vulnerable OpenSTAManager deployments.
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