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Godot MCP (npm package @coding-solo/godot-mcp), an MCP server for interacting with the Godot game engine, is vulnerable to OS command injection prior to version 0.1.1. The executeOperation function passes user-controlled input (notably projectPath) directly to exec(), which invokes a shell. An attacker can supply shell metacharacters (e.g., $(command) or &calc) in projectPath to execute arbitrary commands. Multiple operations that accept projectPath are affected, including create_scene, add_node, load_sprite, and others. The issue is patched in 0.1.1 by replacing exec() with execFile() to avoid shell invocation.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-25546 affecting Coding-Solo’s godot-mcp versions < 0.1.1. Structure is minimal (2 files): a README describing the vulnerability (CWE-78) and a single Python PoC script. Core capability: the script connects to the godot-mcp MCP WebSocket server (default ws://127.0.0.1:8765) and sends a crafted JSON `tool_call` for the `create_scene` tool. The injection point is the `projectPath` parameter, which (in vulnerable versions) is unsafely interpolated into Node.js `exec()`/`execAsync()` calls, enabling arbitrary OS command execution under the server’s privileges. Payload behavior: on Linux/macOS it uses command substitution in `projectPath` to run `id` and redirect output to /tmp/CVE_2026_25546_POC, then checks for that file to confirm execution. On Windows it uses `&` command chaining to attempt to launch calc.exe and prints a note indicating calc should appear if exploitation succeeded. No additional modules, persistence, lateral movement, or post-exploitation logic is present; it is a straightforward network-triggered RCE PoC with a simple proof mechanism.
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