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Tenda G300-F router firmware 16.01.14.2 and earlier contains an OS command injection flaw in the WAN diagnostic functionality (formSetWanDiag). The vulnerable implementation constructs a shell command that invokes curl and embeds attacker-controlled input into the command line without adequate neutralization, allowing injection of additional shell metacharacters/syntax. A remote attacker with access to the device’s management interface can leverage this to execute arbitrary commands on the router with the privileges of the management process.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a single Python exploit script (xp.py) and a short README describing CVE-2026-25857 affecting Tenda G300-F firmware <= 16.01.14.2. The exploit is a two-stage, unauthenticated(?) network attack against the router’s HTTP management interface: it first POSTs to /goform/setNetCheck with a malicious `hostname` value, then POSTs to /goform/setWanDiag to trigger the WAN diagnostic handler (formSetWanDiag) that executes the injected content. xp.py supports two operational modes: `revshell` (injects a netcat reverse shell command and expects a callback to attacker-controlled <lhost>:<lport>) and `dropfile` (injects curl/wget-like arguments to download a remote URL and save it to an attacker-specified output path on the router). No scanning/detection logic is included; it is an active exploitation tool with hardcoded HTTP endpoints and simple argument parsing.
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