CVE-2026-25939 is an authorization bypass vulnerability in FUXA, a web-based SCADA/HMI/dashboard platform. Affected versions 1.2.8 through 1.2.10 improperly enforce authorization on scheduler management functionality, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to create, modify, or delete arbitrary schedulers. The issue affects deployments even when secure mode is enabled. Because FUXA schedulers can trigger immediately or on a recurring basis and can invoke existing automation logic within the platform, the flaw exposes connected industrial control and SCADA environments to unauthorized operational actions and potential server-side follow-on abuse. The vulnerability was patched in version 1.2.11.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a single Python PoC exploit (CVE-2026-25939.py) and a README. The exploit targets FUXA (open-source SCADA/ICS) versions >= 1.2.8 and < 1.2.11, abusing an authorization bypass on the unauthenticated /api/scheduler endpoint. Core capabilities: (1) vulnerability check by issuing unauthenticated GET/POST to /api/scheduler and interpreting HTTP status codes (200 => vulnerable; 401/403 => likely patched), (2) creation of a new scheduler with a unique ID and attacker-controlled `script` field scheduled to run shortly and recurrently, (3) verification of creation via GET /api/scheduler?id=<scheduler_id>, and (4) deletion of an arbitrary scheduler via DELETE /api/scheduler?id=<id>. The code uses the requests library, takes a target base URL as input, and provides CLI flags --check, --command (script content), and --delete. No external C2 infrastructure is embedded; the only network target is the user-supplied FUXA instance, with the fingerprintable path /api/scheduler and example port 1881.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A FUXA vulnerability mentioned as having been subject to active exploitation attempts in the past year.
Another FUXA vulnerability mentioned as having seen active exploitation efforts over the past year.
A critical unauthenticated scheduler manipulation vulnerability in FUXA that allows attackers to create arbitrary schedulers and execute actions in the FUXA context.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.