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CVE-2026-26335 affects Calero VeraSMART versions prior to 2022 R1. The VeraSMART web application uses static ASP.NET/IIS machineKey values configured in the application's web.config file at C:\Program Files (x86)\Veramark\VeraSMART\WebRoot\web.config. If an attacker obtains these machineKey values, they can generate a malicious ASP.NET ViewState payload that passes integrity validation performed by the application. Because the forged ViewState is accepted as valid, exploitation leads to server-side deserialization and ultimately remote code execution within the VeraSMART IIS application context.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
Repository contains a single Python exploit script and a README. The exploit targets CVE-2026-26335 in Calero VeraSMART versions prior to 2022 R1: static/hardcoded ASP.NET machineKey values allow an attacker who knows the validationKey and decryptionKey to forge a valid, signed and encrypted __VIEWSTATE. The script automates (1) discovery of ViewState-enabled ASPX endpoints, (2) extraction of __VIEWSTATEGENERATOR, (3) optional handling of ViewStateUserKey, (4) generation of a malicious ViewState using an external ysoserial.net binary (ysoserial.exe), and (5) delivery of the forged ViewState via HTTP POST to trigger unsafe deserialization and execute an arbitrary command under the IIS application pool identity. The script supports a check-only mode, optional explicit endpoint and generator overrides, configurable algorithms (defaults SHA1/AES), and optional HTTP proxying for debugging. README documents prerequisites (Python3, ysoserial.net, machine keys), usage examples, and notes that keys are not public and may be obtained from the target web.config (or via a related file-read issue CVE-2026-26333).
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