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Hyland Alfresco contains an improper authorization issue in the "/share/page/resource/" endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from protected application directories (e.g., "WEB-INF"). This can result in disclosure of sensitive configuration files accessible to the application but intended to be protected from direct access.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small standalone Python proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-26336 affecting Alfresco Share. It contains two files: a README describing the vulnerability, affected versions, impact, and usage; and poc.py, the actual exploit implementation. The exploit targets the Alfresco Share static resource endpoint /share/page/resource/ and abuses path traversal using the bypass sequence '..;/' to read files relative to the deployed webapp root without authentication. The core logic is in read_file(), which constructs a URL as <base_url>/share/page/resource/..;/<filepath> and issues an HTTP GET with TLS verification disabled. The script first checks vulnerability by attempting to retrieve WEB-INF/web.xml. If successful, it reports the target as vulnerable. Operational capabilities include: reading a single arbitrary file specified by the operator with --file, verifying vulnerability via WEB-INF/web.xml, and bulk dumping a predefined list of sensitive files with --dump. The default target list includes servlet configuration, Alfresco global properties, encrypted properties, Share configuration, keystores, truststores, keystore password files, and META-INF/MANIFEST.MF. When dumping text files smaller than 5000 bytes, the script also scans lines for likely secrets using keywords such as pass, secret, key=, cred, jdbc, db., token, and encrypt, then prints matching lines. The exploit is not part of a larger framework and is best classified as OPERATIONAL: it is functional exploit code with a fixed technique and basic automation, but not a modular weaponized framework. It is clearly an exploit rather than a pure detector because it performs actual unauthorized file retrieval and local storage of stolen content.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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