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CVE-2026-26899 is an OS command injection vulnerability in the setInitAction function of OpenWrt's luci-app-https-dns-proxy, affecting versions prior to the fix associated with OpenWrt PR #15 on 2026-01-17. The function insufficiently sanitizes the user-controlled name parameter before it is incorporated into shell command processing, allowing shell metacharacters to alter the intended command.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small standalone Python PoC exploit for CVE-2026-26899 affecting OpenWrt's luci-app-https-dns-proxy. The repo contains only three files: a minimal .gitignore, a README describing the vulnerability and affected/fixed versions, and a single executable script, exploit.py, which is the main entry point. The exploit is not part of a larger framework. Its workflow is straightforward: it prompts the operator for a target router IP, low-privileged LuCI credentials, and a desired new root password; authenticates to the OpenWrt ubus JSON-RPC endpoint at http://<target>/ubus using session.login; inspects returned ACLs to verify the user can call luci.https-dns-proxy.setInitAction; and then sends a crafted JSON-RPC request to that vulnerable method. The injected value is placed in the name parameter and breaks into the shell with a payload that runs printf '<pw>\n<pw>\n' | passwd root, thereby changing the root password. Primary capability: authenticated remote command execution as root via command injection in the LuCI RPC backend, operationalized here specifically as privilege escalation/root takeover by resetting the root password. The exploit does not provide a general interactive shell, persistence module, or payload customization framework beyond the chosen password, so it is best classified as OPERATIONAL rather than weaponized. Notable fingerprintable artifacts include the /ubus HTTP endpoint, the ubus methods session.login and luci.https-dns-proxy.setInitAction, and the post-exploitation SSH access pattern ssh root@<target>. The script uses Python requests for network communication and includes basic success/failure handling based on JSON-RPC responses.
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