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MajorDoMo (Major Domestic Module) contains an unauthenticated remote code execution path via its auto-update mechanism, reachable through the saverestore module. The saverestore module exposes its admin() method at /objects/?module=saverestore without authentication due to using gr('mode') (reading directly from $_REQUEST) rather than the framework’s $this->mode for privileged mode selection. An attacker can invoke the auto_update_settings mode handler to poison the system update URL, then invoke the force_update handler to trigger the update chain. The autoUpdateSystem() logic fetches an Atom feed from the attacker-controlled URL with minimal validation, downloads a tarball using curl with TLS certificate verification disabled (CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER=FALSE), extracts it via exec('tar xzvf ...'), and copies extracted files into the document root via copyTree(), enabling deployment of arbitrary PHP files (e.g., webshells) and resulting in RCE.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
Repository contains a single Python proof-of-concept exploit server for CVE-2026-27180 affecting MajorDoMo (pre-fix/PR #1177). The exploit abuses unauthenticated access to MajorDoMo’s update configuration and forced update actions to poison the update URL (CWE-494: download of code without integrity check). The script generates a malicious tar.gz entirely in memory containing a password-protected PHP webshell (poc.php) and an optional .htaccess, then runs a local HTTP server that serves a fake Atom feed at /master.xml which points to the tarball at /archive/master.tar.gz. Operator workflow: start the attacker server (lhost/lport), send two unauthenticated GET requests to the target (/objects/?module=saverestore&mode=auto_update_settings&set_update_url=... and /objects/?module=saverestore&mode=force_update), wait for the target to fetch/extract/copy files into the web root, then execute commands via http://target/poc.php?pass=ChangeMe123&cmd=.... Repo structure is minimal: CVE-2026-27180.py (standalone exploit server using only Python stdlib) and README.md (attack flow, usage, and references).
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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