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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a self-contained Docker lab and proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-27541, an authenticated privilege-escalation / broken access control issue in the WooCommerce Wholesale Prices plugin. The main exploit logic is in poc.py, a Python script that authenticates to WordPress via /wp-login.php, loads the wholesale settings admin page, extracts wpApiSettings.nonce and REST root from page content, and then submits a JSON payload to the plugin REST endpoint wwp/v1/admin/save. The payload changes the setting wwp_see_wholesale_prices_replacement_text to PWNED_BY_POC, providing a safe observable proof of unauthorized admin settings modification. Repository structure is small and purposeful: poc.py contains the exploit flow; docker-compose.yml defines two parallel WordPress environments (vulnerable on localhost:8081 and patched on localhost:8082) with separate MariaDB backends; scripts/seed-wp.sh provisions WordPress, installs WooCommerce and the target plugin, creates admin and shop_manager users, creates a test product, and writes lab-secrets.json for verification; vuln/Dockerfile and patched/Dockerfile build the two WordPress nodes. README.md documents the vulnerability, expected behavior, and lab usage. The exploit is not unauthenticated and not destructive. It requires valid credentials plus a valid WordPress nonce, so the attack vector is an authenticated web/REST API abuse. The vulnerable condition described is that plugin version 2.2.6 authorizes the admin save route with a capability broad enough for shop_manager (manage_woocommerce), while patched 2.2.7 requires manage_options and returns 403. Overall, this is a real operational PoC and lab environment for demonstrating post-authentication unauthorized configuration changes rather than code execution or shell access.
3 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.