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WPGraphQL (wp-graphql/wp-graphql) prior to 2.9.1 contains an OS command injection flaw in its GitHub Actions workflow release.yml. The workflow directly interpolates the untrusted value ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }} into a run: shell block. When a pull request from develop to master is merged, the pull request body is injected verbatim into a shell command, enabling an attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands on the GitHub Actions runner in the context of that workflow run. Version 2.9.1 fixes the issue.
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What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
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run: blocks. If such data must be used, ensure robust quoting/escaping and prefer passing data via environment variables or files with safe handling. Additionally, restrict workflow permissions and secrets exposure for PR-triggered or merge-triggered workflows to minimize blast radius if command execution occurs.Patch, then assume compromise.
run: steps in release.yml.No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 1 candidate as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.
All candidate exploits were filtered out by Mallory's validation.
2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.