CVE-2026-27966 is a critical remote code execution vulnerability in Langflow affecting versions prior to 1.8.0. The flaw is in the CSV Agent node, which hardcodes allow_dangerous_code=True. This automatically exposes LangChain’s Python REPL tool, python_repl_ast, to agent prompts. Because the exposed tool can execute Python code, an attacker can use prompt injection through the Langflow chat or agent interaction path to cause execution of arbitrary Python statements and OS commands on the server hosting Langflow. The issue effectively turns prompt input into code execution capability within the server context, resulting in full RCE.
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allow_dangerous_code=True. Apply the vendor patch referenced in the GitHub Security Advisory and associated fixing commit.2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
Repository contains a standalone Python exploit/scanner for CVE-2026-27966 affecting Langflow versions prior to 1.8.0. Structure is minimal: one main Python script (cve_2026_27966.py), a README with exploitation details and usage examples, requirements.txt, and .gitignore. The script is not part of a larger exploitation framework. Primary capability: identify Langflow instances, determine likely vulnerability status from version information, test whether API access is protected, attempt auto_login token acquisition, and if exploitation is enabled pursue remote code execution. The README describes three exploitation paths: (1) route injection via /api/v1/custom_component to register a malicious FastAPI route, (2) direct route injection without API key where allowed, and (3) build/vertex injection using exposed flow UUIDs and unauthenticated build/run endpoints. It also references CSV Agent prompt injection through LangChain's python_repl_ast tool as an additional RCE mechanism. Observed code behavior from the available script portion: it imports requests/urllib3, disables TLS warnings, randomizes User-Agent strings, supports single-target and mass-scan modes, and uses argparse for CLI handling. Detection logic probes both HTTPS and HTTP, checks /api/v1/version for Langflow fingerprints, falls back to /health, and marks versions < 1.8 as vulnerable. It also probes /api/v1/custom_component to infer whether an API key is required and attempts /api/v1/auto_login to obtain credentials or tokens. The exploit is operational rather than a simple detector because it is explicitly designed to move beyond fingerprinting into command execution. The payload described in the repository is a Python FastAPI route that executes shell commands via os.popen and returns output over HTTP, enabling persistent in-memory backdoor access until restart. The repository’s purpose is therefore offensive security testing of exposed Langflow instances, with both reconnaissance and exploitation workflows, including concurrent mass scanning.
Repository contains a single Python exploit tool (langflow.py) plus a README. The tool is an all-in-one network exploit targeting alleged Langflow RCE (CVE-2026-27966). It supports single-target and mass scanning (threaded), automatic detection of Langflow instances, optional automatic flow creation (to obtain a flow_id when missing), and then remote command execution against the target via Langflow’s HTTP API. Post-exploitation capability is an interactive command loop (“interactive shell”) that repeatedly sends attacker-supplied OS commands and prints cleaned output. Key capabilities implemented in code: - HTTP client with User-Agent rotation and optional proxy support (proxy list loaded from a local file). - Multi-threaded scanning of many targets from an input file; tracks counts of scanned/langflow/vulnerable and stores exploited results. - Exploitation workflow: detect instance → obtain/create flow_id → send crafted request to execute a command → parse/clean response output. - Operator features: debug logging, save vulnerable URLs to an output file, run a single command or interactive shell. Notable endpoints/targets: - The exploit primarily targets user-supplied base URLs (e.g., http(s)://<host>:7860). The README provides example targets and file names (targets.txt). The code also references local file paths for proxy lists and output results. (The specific Langflow API paths used for detection/flow creation/command execution are not visible in the provided truncated snippet, but the structure clearly indicates multiple endpoint checks and a flow-based RCE trigger.)
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A previously disclosed Langflow vulnerability involving prompt injection leading to Python REPL execution, cited as part of the platform's broader RCE history.
Critical remote code execution (RCE) in Langflow’s CSV Agent node caused by hardcoded enabling of dangerous code execution (allow_dangerous_code=True), which exposes LangChain’s python_repl_ast tool to attacker-controlled prompts, enabling OS command execution via prompt injection through the chat interface.
A remote code execution vulnerability in Langflow where the CSV Agent node hardcodes dangerous code execution enabled, exposing LangChain's Python REPL tool and allowing prompt-injection-driven arbitrary Python/OS command execution on the server.
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