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In ZimaOS (a fork of CasaOS) version 1.5.2-beta3, restrictions intended to prevent creation of files/folders within internal OS paths are implemented only in the frontend/UI. When a client interacts directly with the backend API, these UI-enforced restrictions can be bypassed by supplying crafted path values (e.g., targeting /etc, /usr, or other sensitive directories). The API does not properly validate or constrain the target path, allowing unauthorized creation of files or directories in critical system locations that should not be writable by normal users.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a standalone Python PoC toolkit for CVE-2026-28286, described as an arbitrary file write issue in ZimaOS caused by missing path validation in its file API. The codebase is small and modular: poc.py is the CLI entry point; core/client.py wraps HTTP interaction with the target API; core/runner.py orchestrates single-target and batch exploitation attempts and logs results; core/verifier.py confirms exploitation success using read and directory-listing API calls; core/utils.py provides filename generation, timestamps, and terminal colors. The exploit capability is straightforward: it sends a POST request to /v2_1/files/file with a user-controlled absolute path and static test content, enabling writes outside intended directories if the target is vulnerable. It supports single target mode, batch mode from a targets file, repeated attempts, optional proxying, and optional Bearer authentication. Verification is more than blind detection: it first tries GET /v2_1/files/file?path=<full_path> to read the file back, then falls back to GET /v2_1/files/list?path=<directory> to confirm the filename appears in a listing. Because it performs an actual write and then validates the result, this is a real exploit PoC rather than a pure detector. The payload is basic and hardcoded, so the repository is best classified as OPERATIONAL rather than weaponized. Notable fingerprintable targets are the ZimaOS API paths /v2_1/files/file and /v2_1/files/list, along with example filesystem paths such as /tmp, /etc, and /usr/local/bin/. The tool also writes local findings to results.jsonl.
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5 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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