CVE-2026-28318 is an unauthenticated denial-of-service vulnerability in SolarWinds Serv-U 15.5.4 and earlier. Serv-U's web-interface HTTP request handling can process a POST request carrying a non-empty body and a Content-Encoding value of deflate before authentication. Under the default HTTP-compression configuration, a conditional rejection check is bypassed and the body reaches an in-memory decompression path. Faulty buffer management in that path causes an invalid free and heap-corruption detection terminates the Serv-U process. SolarWinds addressed the issue in Serv-U 15.5.4 Hotfix 1 by rejecting requests with a body and a non-empty Content-Encoding header before body processing.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (3 hidden).
This repository is a small, focused proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-28318 affecting SolarWinds Serv-U. It contains three files: an MIT LICENSE, a detailed README with root-cause analysis, and a single executable Python script `poc_verify.py`. The exploit is not part of a larger framework. The README explains that the issue is an unauthenticated network-reachable denial of service in the Serv-U HTTP/HTTPS listener, specifically in the `RhinoNET.dll` deflate handling path. According to the analysis, any HTTP request with `Content-Encoding: deflate` and a valid raw deflate body causes the server to free an interior pointer into the HTTP receive buffer rather than a heap allocation base, leading to heap corruption and a crash (`0xC0000374`, `STATUS_HEAP_CORRUPTION`). The write-up emphasizes that this is not a decompression bomb and that the crash is independent of decompressed size. The Python script operationalizes that analysis. It builds a highly compressible payload using Python's standard `zlib` library with raw deflate (`wbits=-zlib.MAX_WBITS`), then sends one or more crafted HTTP POST requests to the target host and port. The request is minimal and always targets `/`, with the critical header `Content-Encoding: deflate`. The body can be either a small stream that inflates to 4096 null bytes or, with `--big`, 8192 'A' bytes. The exploit capability is therefore a pre-authenticated remote service crash against vulnerable Serv-U web listeners. The script also includes verification logic tailored for Windows-hosted local or authorized testing. It uses PowerShell `Get-NetTCPConnection` to determine the PID listening on the chosen port before and after sending the payload, and optionally uses `Get-WinEvent` to count new Application log crash events matching Serv-U and `c0000374`. Success is reported when the PID changes, the listener disappears, or matching heap-corruption events appear. This makes the PoC more than a bare trigger: it is a practical crash-verification tool for patch validation. Overall, the repository's purpose is defensive validation of patch status and crash reproducibility for a known Serv-U vulnerability. It does not contain an RCE payload, persistence, lateral movement logic, or post-exploitation features. Its sole capability is reliable unauthenticated DoS against vulnerable Serv-U HTTP/HTTPS services, plus local verification of the resulting crash.
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A separate SolarWinds Web Help Desk vulnerability referenced only as having been added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
An unauthenticated denial-of-service vulnerability in the SolarWinds Serv-U web interface that can crash the service via a crafted POST request using the Content-Encoding: deflate header, leading to heap corruption and process termination.
An unauthenticated denial-of-service vulnerability in SolarWinds Serv-U where a POST request with a Content-Encoding: deflate header and a body triggers heap corruption via an invalid free, crashing the service. The analysis concludes the practical impact is availability-only DoS rather than remote code execution.
An unauthenticated denial-of-service vulnerability in SolarWinds Serv-U's web interface where a POST request with a Content-Encoding: deflate header and a body triggers heap corruption and crashes the service.
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