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In OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.23, the tools.exec.safeBins validation logic for the "sort" tool when operating in allowlist mode could be bypassed by using GNU long-option abbreviations. The validation/deny logic only rejected an exact long option string (e.g., "--compress-program"), but did not account for equivalent abbreviated forms accepted by GNU getopt (e.g., "--compress-prog"). As a result, an attacker could evade the intended allow/deny checks and reach approval-free execution paths that were designed to require explicit approval.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a small standalone exploit PoC with two files: a Spanish-language advisory README and a Python exploit script. The main code is exploit.py, a command-line Python tool using requests, argparse, and urllib3. It targets vulnerable OpenClaw instances by POSTing JSON to the API endpoint /api/tools/exec with a Bearer token. The exploit abuses an allowlist validation bypass involving GNU sort option abbreviation, specifically injecting a shell command through --compress-prog=sh -c '<payload>'. The script supports three modes: default execution of 'id' to verify RCE, arbitrary command execution via --cmd, and a hardcoded netcat reverse shell via --lhost/--lport. It disables TLS verification warnings and sends requests with verify=False, indicating intended use against HTTPS targets with self-signed certificates as well. Success is inferred from HTTP status codes 200/201/202/204; 401/403 are treated as auth failures. The README documents the claimed vulnerability, affected versions (<2026.2.23), mitigation guidance, and references. Overall, this is an operational network/web RCE exploit rather than a detector, with a basic but functional payload delivery mechanism.
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9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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