CVE-2026-28609 is an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the read path of Android's MatroskaExtractor.cpp. Improper casting can cause a write outside the intended memory bounds while processing Matroska content. The flaw can be exploited remotely to execute code without requiring additional execution privileges or user interaction.
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This is a standalone proof-of-concept repository for CVE-2026-28609, an out-of-bounds write in Android's MatroskaExtractor. The flaw occurs when MatroskaSource::read handles 16-bit big-endian PCM: it casts the frame base address to uint16_t* before adding a byte-based range_offset, causing the offset to be scaled by two. A range_offset of one therefore starts the in-place byte-swap one byte too far into the allocation and reaches one byte past its end. The repository contains a Python generator (exploit/generator.py), a C++ C-ABI harness (harness/harness_c_abi.cpp), and four Bash build/run scripts. The generator constructs a minimal WebM file with DocType webm, A_PCM/INT/BIG audio, 16-bit samples, ContentEncodings encryption metadata, and frames whose leading clear signal byte causes the extractor to set range_offset=1. It supports configurable frame count, PCM payload size, and fixed/Xiph/EBML lacing, plus verification of generated files. The C++ harness dlopen()s an ASan-instrumented rebuilt extractor plugin, resolves GETEXTRACTORDEF, supplies a file-backed CDataSource and malloc-backed CMediaBufferGroup, and reads every track frame through the extractor C ABI. This makes the resulting heap boundary violation observable with AddressSanitizer. The build scripts compile selected AOSP foundation components, MatroskaExtractor.cpp and libwebm parser sources, build the harness, and use ADB to stage and execute artifacts on an Android device. No network service, remote callback, shell payload, privilege escalation, or RCE chain is implemented; although the documented impact is potential RCE, this repository is an ASan-oriented memory-corruption reproduction.
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