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CVE-2026-30951 is a SQL injection vulnerability in Sequelize, a Node.js ORM, affecting versions prior to 6.37.8. The flaw is in JSON/JSONB where-clause processing within the _traverseJSON() function. That function splits JSON path keys on a double-colon delimiter to derive a cast type, then interpolates the extracted value directly into a CAST(... AS <type>) SQL expression without proper escaping or validation. If an attacker can control JSON object keys used in these query conditions, they can inject arbitrary SQL through the cast type field. The vulnerability can be used to manipulate generated queries and access data beyond the intended query scope.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This five-file repository is a self-contained Node.js/Express vulnerability playground rather than an automated scanner or generalized exploit framework. Its primary executable, app.js, initializes an in-memory SQLite database through Sequelize 6.37.7, defines User and Flag models, seeds User records, and starts an HTTP service on port 9100. Dockerfile provides a Node 20 container deployment, while package.json/package-lock.json pin Express 4.21.2, Sequelize 6.37.7, and sqlite3 5.1.7. The vulnerable behavior is in buildApp() at POST /api/users/search. A request body filter object is accepted without a key allowlist. The special case of exactly `{ "name": "..." }` uses an in-memory substring search, but other filter shapes are sent directly to `User.findAll({ where: { metadata: filter } })`. With Sequelize 6.37.7, a metadata key with a `::` suffix can cause the suffix to be used as an unvalidated SQL cast type during JSON traversal. The documented key `name::text) or 1=1--` demonstrates boolean SQL-condition manipulation, causing the normally restrictive metadata predicate to match all users. SQL generated for this nonstandard path is logged to stdout. The repository contains no outbound command-and-control, reverse shell, persistence mechanism, or destructive behavior. It is an operational local PoC/challenge application: its payload is a fixed JSON/SQL injection example, and successful exploitation returns application data from the search API. The Flag model and FLAG environment variable are present in the application, but the visible code excerpt does not establish a network route that exposes the Flag table or environment variable. Remediation is to upgrade Sequelize to 6.37.8 or later and construct JSON filters only from server-side allowlisted fields rather than accepting arbitrary user-controlled object keys.
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