In liquidjs (a Shopify/GitHub Pages-compatible JavaScript template engine) prior to 10.25.0, the built-in template tags layout, render, and include can be abused to access arbitrary files on the host filesystem by supplying absolute paths. The absolute path can be provided directly as a string literal in the template, or indirectly via a Liquid variable; the variable-based technique requires dynamicPartials: true (which is the default). The issue becomes exploitable when an attacker can control template content or influence the filepath used by these tags.
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What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
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dynamicPartials where feasible to reduce exposure to variable-driven path selection.Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository is a minimal Node.js Proof-of-Concept for CVE-2026-30952 (LiquidJS liquidjs < 10.25.0) path traversal leading to arbitrary file read. Structure: (1) README.md explains the issue, affected versions, and reproduction steps; (2) exploit.js is the sole exploit script; (3) package.json pins liquidjs to 10.24.0 and provides an npm script to run the PoC. Exploit behavior (exploit.js): creates a Liquid engine with root and partials set to /tmp and dynamicPartials enabled, then renders a template containing '{% include page %}' while supplying page='../../../etc/passwd'. Due to insufficient path validation/fallback behavior in vulnerable liquidjs, the include resolves outside the intended root and reads the target file, printing the first 500 characters to stdout. No network activity, persistence, or code execution is present—capability is limited to local file disclosure via template path traversal when attacker controls template content or variables used by include/layout/render tags.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.