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Critical

Heap out-of-bounds write in Linux kernel usbip_pack_ret_submit()

IdentifiersCVE-2026-31607CWE-787· Out-of-bounds Write

CVE-2026-31607 is a Linux kernel USB/IP client-side memory corruption vulnerability in the handling of RET_SUBMIT responses for isochronous URBs. In usbip_pack_ret_submit(), the client unconditionally overwrites urb->number_of_packets with the number_of_packets value received from the network PDU. That field is later used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb->iso_frame_desc[], a flexible array whose size was fixed when the URB was originally allocated based on the number_of_packets from the earlier CMD_SUBMIT request. A malicious USB/IP server can return a RET_SUBMIT response with number_of_packets larger than the original submitted value, causing usbip_recv_iso() to write past the end of urb->iso_frame_desc[] and trigger a heap out-of-bounds write. The issue was confirmed by KASAN on kernel 7.0.0-rc5 as a slab-out-of-bounds write in usbip_recv_iso(). The fix adds validation in usbip_pack_ret_submit() to ensure rpdu->number_of_packets does not exceed the original urb->number_of_packets before overwriting it; invalid values are clamped to zero so downstream receive/padding paths return safely.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation allows a malicious USB/IP server to corrupt heap memory in kernel space on the client system. The immediate consequence is an out-of-bounds write into memory adjacent to urb->iso_frame_desc[], which can lead to kernel crashes or denial of service. Because the corruption occurs in kernel context and is attacker-influenced over the network protocol, the impact can potentially extend to broader kernel memory corruption and possible code execution, depending on target state and exploitability.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

If patching is not immediately possible, reduce exposure by disabling or avoiding use of the USB/IP client functionality where feasible, and do not connect vulnerable clients to untrusted or unauthenticated USB/IP servers. Restrict network reachability to trusted USB/IP endpoints only, using segmentation and access controls to prevent malicious servers from delivering crafted RET_SUBMIT responses.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade to a Linux kernel release containing the fix for CVE-2026-31607. The remediation is to validate rpdu->number_of_packets against the original urb->number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before updating the URB state, and to reject or clamp invalid values so usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() cannot iterate beyond the originally allocated iso_frame_desc[] bounds. Vendor kernel updates from SUSE, Red Hat, and downstream distributions include this fix.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

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VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

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VendorProductType
LinuxLinux Kerneloperating_system

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ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.

No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.

What this page doesn’t show

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Threat actor evidence

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Associated malware

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Detection signatures

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Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity1

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