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CVE-2026-32255 is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in Kan, an open-source project management tool. In versions 0.5.4 and earlier, the /api/download/attatchment API endpoint does not enforce authentication and does not validate the user-supplied URL parameter before passing it directly to a server-side fetch() call. The endpoint then returns the full response body to the requester. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause the Kan server to issue arbitrary HTTP requests to attacker-chosen destinations, including internal services, private network resources, and cloud instance metadata endpoints, and to relay the retrieved content back to the attacker.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small standalone proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-32255, an unauthenticated full-read SSRF in Kan <= 0.5.4. The repo contains two code files: exploit.sh, the main entry point, and internal-service.py, a helper service used to simulate an internal-only target. The Bash exploit accepts a target Kan base URL and an optional internal URL, defaults the internal target to http://<docker-bridge-gateway>:8888, checks reachability of /api/download/attatchment, then sends a GET request with a url parameter pointing to the internal resource. If the server returns the fetched body, the script reports the target as vulnerable and prints the leaked content. This demonstrates the core exploit capability: arbitrary server-side HTTP requests to internal resources with response exfiltration to the attacker. The Python helper starts a simple HTTP server on port 8888 and returns mock sensitive JSON data, illustrating how the SSRF can expose internal configuration or credentials. Overall, the repository’s purpose is to reproduce and validate the SSRF issue, not to provide post-exploitation tooling or a customizable payload framework.
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8 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.