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CVE-2026-32604 is a critical command-injection vulnerability in Spinnaker Clouddriver's Git repository artifact handling, in the clouddriver-artifacts-gitrepo component. User-controlled Git artifact configuration values, including branch/version and path fields, are insufficiently validated before being incorporated into a shell command used to invoke Git archive operations. Shell metacharacters can therefore escape the intended Git argument context and cause attacker-supplied commands to execute in the Clouddriver pod.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This two-file repository contains a Python 3 operational exploit and supporting README for CVE-2026-32604, an unauthenticated command-injection issue in Spinnaker Clouddriver's git/repo artifact handling. exploit.py is the sole executable entry point. It builds an HTTP base URL from target and port, checks GET /health, queries GET /artifacts/credentials to verify that a configured git/repo artifact account exists, and sends a malicious git/repo artifact request to PUT /artifacts/fetch. The attack places shell syntax in the artifact version field, causing arbitrary command execution in the Clouddriver service/pod context. The tool supports a configurable one-shot command (default writes the target's id output to /lab/cve-2026-32604-rce.txt) or a configurable reverse-shell callback. Its additional code manages a listening socket, interactive terminal I/O, terminal restoration, window sizing, and potential PTY helper placement in common writable temporary directories. README.md documents the HTTP flow, sample artifact account lab-gitrepo, a Bash reverse-shell example, affected/fixed release information, and mitigation by upgrading or disabling git/repo artifacts. No named exploit framework is used.
Repository contains two standalone Python exploit POCs plus a full Docker-based lab to reproduce and validate two critical Spinnaker RCE issues. The main exploit files are pocs/clouddriver_rce_via_git_clone.py for CVE-2026-32604 and pocs/echo_rce_via_spel.py for CVE-2026-32613. Both scripts use requests for HTTP interaction and implement a local TCP listener plus terminal bridging to provide an interactive reverse shell after successful exploitation. CVE-2026-32604 targets Clouddriver’s artifact fetch functionality. The exploit sends a PUT request to /artifacts/fetch with type git/repo, a configured artifact account, a repository reference, and a malicious version/branch value that is later passed into a shell command. It supports two access paths: direct unauthenticated access to Clouddriver on port 7002 or authenticated access through Gate on port 8084. Successful exploitation yields code execution in the Clouddriver container, which is especially sensitive because it stores cloud credentials and artifact account secrets. CVE-2026-32613 targets Echo’s evaluation of expectedArtifacts using unrestricted Spring Expression Language. The exploit authenticates to Gate, creates or updates a pipeline containing a malicious SpEL expression, then repeatedly triggers it via POST /pipelines/v2/{app}/{pipeline}. When Echo evaluates the expression, it spawns a reverse shell back to the attacker. This provides code execution in the Echo container and can expose environment variables, credentials, and internal service URLs. The setup/ directory is substantial and purpose-built for reproducibility. It includes Docker Compose definitions for a multi-service Spinnaker deployment (Gate, Orca, Clouddriver, Front50, Fiat, Echo) and supporting infrastructure (Redis, MySQL, Elasticsearch, MinIO, OpenLDAP). YAML configs intentionally enable the vulnerable features and seed realistic credentials, including artifact accounts and example AWS keys. setup.sh clones a pinned Spinnaker source tree, builds services from source, builds a base image, starts the lab, and prints example exploit commands. seed.sh provisions applications, permissions, service accounts, and pipelines needed to exercise the vulnerabilities. teardown.sh removes the environment. Overall, this is a real exploit repository rather than a detector. It is operational, not framework-based, and designed to demonstrate authenticated and internal-network RCE against Spinnaker services, followed by credential access and lateral movement within the deployment.
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An OS command-injection vulnerability in Spinnaker's git/repo artifact-fetch functionality. A malicious value in the version field is incorporated into a shell command, enabling arbitrary command execution in the context of the service processing the artifact request.
A critical Spinnaker vulnerability rated 10.0 that can allow arbitrary code execution and access to production cloud environments and source control.
A critical remote code execution vulnerability in Spinnaker Clouddriver’s git repository artifact handling.
A critical remote command execution vulnerability in Spinnaker's clouddriver gitrepo artifacts component caused by improper input validation of branch and paths fields, allowing a low-privileged authenticated user to execute arbitrary commands on clouddriver pods.
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