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CVE-2026-33229 affects XWiki Platform versions prior to 17.4.8 and 17.10.1. The issue is caused by an improperly protected scripting API that allows a user who already has script right to bypass the sandboxing enforced by the Velocity scripting API. By abusing this access control weakness, the attacker can execute arbitrary scripts, including Python, outside the intended sandbox restrictions. The result is effective arbitrary code execution within the XWiki environment and full access to the XWiki instance.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a minimal proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-33229, described as an XWiki Platform remote code execution issue caused by an Apache Velocity sandbox bypass. The repository contains only two files: a single-line PoC payload file and a README documenting the vulnerability, impact, and disclosure timeline. There is no exploit framework, delivery tooling, authentication handling, or automation logic. The core exploit capability is server-side code execution in a web context. The PoC traverses objects already exposed in the Velocity context, accesses the servlet context, retrieves the Tomcat InstanceManager via the attribute org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager, instantiates org.apache.batik.script.jpython.JPythonInterpreter, and evaluates Python code that invokes os.system('touch /tmp/RCE'). This demonstrates arbitrary command execution on the underlying host. Operationally, this is an authenticated web exploit rather than a standalone remote unauthenticated exploit. The README states the required privileges are an authenticated user with scripting permission. The payload is hardcoded and basic, so the repository is best classified as OPERATIONAL rather than weaponized. It is a real exploit PoC, not a detection script and not a fake exploit. Fingerprintable artifacts in the exploit itself are limited: the marker file /tmp/RCE, the Tomcat servlet context attribute org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager, and the instantiated class org.apache.batik.script.jpython.JPythonInterpreter. The README also includes external reference URLs and the GHSA advisory link, but these are documentation artifacts rather than runtime command-and-control or target endpoints.
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4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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