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CVE-2026-33317 affects OP-TEE in versions 3.13.0 through 4.10.0. The vulnerability is caused by missing bounds checks in entry_get_attribute_value() in ta/pkcs11/src/object.c. These missing validations can cause an out-of-bounds read from the PKCS#11 Trusted Application (TA) heap or trigger a crash. In addition, when this condition is chained with the out-of-bounds read, the PKCS#11 TA function PKCS11_CMD_GET_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE / entry_get_attribute_value() can be induced, via a malformed template parameter, to read up to 7 bytes past the end of the template buffer and write beyond the end of that template buffer using data taken from a PKCS#11 object attribute value.
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PKCS11_CMD_GET_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE. Where possible, limit creation or access to attacker-controlled PKCS#11 objects and templates, and monitor for crashes or anomalous behavior in the PKCS#11 TA. No complete mitigation short of patching is provided in the available content.Patch, then assume compromise.
e031c4e562023fd9f199e39fd2e85797e4cbdca9, 16926d5a46934c46e6656246b4fc18385a246900, and 149e8d7ecc4ef8bb00ab4a37fd2ccede6d79e1ca. If maintaining a downstream branch, backport these patches and verify that bounds checking around entry_get_attribute_value() and PKCS#11 template handling is present.1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a real proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-33317 affecting the OP-TEE PKCS#11 Trusted Application. It is not a framework module; the main exploit is the standalone AArch64 C program c01_poc.c, supported by build_poc.sh, run_c01.sh, and the expect automation script c01_check.exp. The repository also includes documentation and captured logs proving successful reproduction. Core capability: the PoC uses libteec from the Normal World to open a session to the PKCS#11 TA (UUID fd02c9da-306c-48c7-a49c-bbd827ae86ee), initialize a token, open a PKCS#11 session, create an object with a controlled 16-byte CKA_LABEL, and then send a malformed CMD_GET_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE request. The crafted serialized template sets attrs_size=8 and attrs_count=1 while declaring an attribute size of 16, causing the TA to allocate a too-small temporary template buffer and then copy attribute data to an out-of-bounds pointer. The intended effect is Secure World heap corruption; the captured logs show allocator assertion failure and TA panic, so the practical demonstrated result is denial of service of the PKCS#11 TA with a memory corruption primitive that could potentially be developed further. Repository structure: c01_poc.c contains the exploit logic and raw TEEC command packing; build_poc.sh cross-compiles it for AArch64 against libteec; run_c01.sh launches a qemu_v8 OP-TEE lab and shares out/bin into the guest via virtio-9p; c01_check.exp automates guest login, mounting /mnt/host, running /mnt/host/c01_poc, and collecting logs. README.md, qemu-v8-setup.md, reproduction-log.md, and C-01-reproduction.md document the vulnerability, environment, and reproduction steps. out/bin/c01_nw.log and out/bin/c01_sw.log are captured proof logs showing the TA panic after exploitation. Notable endpoints/targets are mostly local lab artifacts rather than external C2 or remote infrastructure: the TA UUID, QEMU binary path, shared guest mount path, output logs, and advisory URLs. The exploit targets OP-TEE PKCS#11 TA versions prior to 4.11, with the reproduced vulnerable build identified as 4.10.0-rc1-7-g06c4e95e4 / commit 06c4e95e469c9c89e9ba4a6915d1be7bb8ea6fbc.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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