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CVE-2026-33475 is an unauthenticated command injection vulnerability affecting multiple GitHub Actions workflows and composite actions in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. The issue arises from direct interpolation of untrusted GitHub context values, including pull request branch names (github.head_ref / github.event.pull_request.head.ref), pull request titles, and custom inputs.*, into run: shell steps. Because these values are attacker-controlled in common pull request and workflow-invocation scenarios, a malicious branch name, PR title, or input can inject shell metacharacters and cause arbitrary command execution in the CI runner. The provided examples show vulnerable patterns such as embedding ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }} directly in shell commands and passing ${{ inputs.browsers }} unquoted to npx playwright install. Successful exploitation can occur during CI/CD execution when an affected workflow is triggered, including from a forked repository pull request, resulting in arbitrary shell command execution in the GitHub Actions environment. Affected files in Langflow 1.3.4 include .github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml, .github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml, .github/workflows/docker-build.yml, .github/workflows/release_nightly.yml, .github/workflows/python_test.yml, and .github/workflows/typescript_test.yml. The vulnerability is patched in version 1.9.0.
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What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
GITHUB_TOKEN, manipulation of build or deployment infrastructure, tampering with artifacts, tags, container images, or releases, and broader supply-chain compromise. Depending on workflow permissions and available secrets, the attacker may be able to modify repository state, leak sensitive infrastructure data, or abuse CI trust relationships.If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
GITHUB_TOKEN and other secrets exposed to CI jobs. Disable or gate workflows that consume branch names, PR titles, or custom inputs in shell contexts. Where such values must be used, move them into environment variables, quote them correctly, and apply input validation to reject shell metacharacters or unexpected values. Review repository settings for forked pull request workflow execution and secret exposure.Patch, then assume compromise.
${{ ... }} expressions inside run: shell commands. Pass untrusted values through environment variables and reference them safely from the shell with proper quoting. Review all workflow files under .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/ for any use of attacker-controlled GitHub context fields or workflow inputs in shell commands, and sanitize or strictly validate those values before use.No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 1 candidate as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.
All candidate exploits were filtered out by Mallory's validation.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
5 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
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Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.