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EspoCRM versions before 9.3.4 contain a path traversal vulnerability in attachment handling. An authenticated administrator can use the built-in formula scripting engine to alter the sourceId property of an Attachment entity. The application incorporates this attacker-controlled value directly into filesystem path construction in the upload-directory path-resolution routine without sanitization, enabling redirection of attachment-related file reads and writes to arbitrary locations permitted by the web server's open_basedir configuration.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small, single-purpose exploit PoC for CVE-2026-33656 affecting EspoCRM <= 9.3.3. It contains two files: a Bash exploit script and a short README with usage instructions. The Bash script is the main artifact and performs a full authenticated RCE chain rather than mere detection. Exploit flow: (1) it authenticates to EspoCRM using an Espo-Authorization header built from supplied username and password; (2) it creates an Attachment object through /api/v1/Attachment; (3) it abuses /api/v1/Formula/action/run to update the attachment's sourceId to ../../client/x, indicating an ACL bypass plus path traversal primitive; (4) it uploads base64-encoded PHP code through /api/v1/Attachment/chunk/<id>, writing a webshell containing system($_GET["c"]); (5) it repeats the process with a second attachment whose sourceId is set to ../../.htaccess; (6) it uploads an .htaccess FilesMatch/SetHandler directive so the file named x is interpreted as PHP; and finally (7) it triggers the webshell at /client/x?c=<cmd> and prints the command output. The exploit's main capability is authenticated arbitrary OS command execution on the target server. It requires admin credentials and a deployment where .htaccess directives are effective. The script includes a simple success check by looking for uid=... in the response to the default id command. Structurally, the repository is minimal and focused: no framework, no auxiliary modules, and no obfuscation—just a direct Bash PoC implementing the full attack chain end-to-end.
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