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CVE-2026-33697 is an architectural weakness in Cocos AI's attested TLS (aTLS) implementation affecting all versions from v0.4.0 through v0.8.2, including both AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX deployment targets. During intra-handshake attestation, the attestation evidence is bound to the ephemeral TLS key, but not to the full TLS channel or application-data channel. If an attacker can obtain the ephemeral TLS private key used for that handshake, the attacker can relay or divert the session while presenting valid attestation evidence originating from the genuine attested service. As a result, the client accepts the connection under false assumptions about the endpoint identity: the attestation proves properties of a genuine attested service, but does not distinguish that service from an attacker-controlled relay endpoint. The issue is described as architectural and remains present despite the aTLS redesign introduced in v0.7.0.
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A high-severity vulnerability in attested TLS / remote attestation for confidential computing TEEs that allows diversion or relay attacks, where a client validates a legitimate attested server but is silently redirected and encrypts data to a malicious machine.
A high-severity vulnerability in intra-handshake attestation / attested TLS that enables relay attacks, allowing a client to validate genuine attestation evidence but encrypt traffic to a different malicious machine instead.
A high-severity relay-attack vulnerability in intra-handshake attested TLS / attested TLS implementations for confidential computing, where a client can validate genuine attestation evidence yet have its connection silently redirected to a different malicious machine.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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