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Nhost is an open source Firebase alternative with GraphQL. Prior to version 1.41.0, The Nhost CLI MCP server, when explicitly configured to listen on a network port, applies no inbound authentication and does not enforce strict CORS. This allows a malicious website visited on the same machine to issue cross-origin requests to the MCP server and invoke privileged tools using the developer's locally configured credentials. This vulnerability requires two explicit, non-default configuration steps to be exploitable. The default nhost mcp start configuration is not affected. This issue has been patched in version 1.41.0.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small proof-of-concept for a browser-based drive-by attack against the Nhost CLI local MCP server. It contains one code file (`exploit.ts`) plus supporting documentation (`README.md`, `REPORT.md`). Despite the `.ts` extension, the exploit file is actually an HTML page with embedded JavaScript and UI elements that acts as a malicious webpage. The exploit’s structure is straightforward: it opens an `EventSource` connection to the local SSE endpoint on the victim machine (`http://localhost:8080/sse`), listens for the `endpoint` event, parses the returned relative message URL to extract the `sessionId`, and then sends a cross-origin `fetch` POST to the session message endpoint using `mode: no-cors` and `Content-Type: text/plain`. That content type is used specifically to force a browser “simple request” and avoid a CORS preflight. The included PoC issues a JSON-RPC `tools/call` request for `list_sessions_and_beacons`, while the report explains that the same primitive can invoke more dangerous MCP tools such as `graphql-query`, `cloud-graphql-query`, and `manage-graphql`. The repository’s purpose is to demonstrate that a malicious website can abuse an unauthenticated local MCP service to execute privileged actions using the developer’s locally configured Nhost credentials. The documentation describes impacts including exfiltrating database contents, modifying data, changing Hasura permissions/metadata, running raw SQL migrations, dropping tables, and abusing cloud PAT/admin secrets. The exploit is a real PoC rather than a scanner or detection script, but it is still best classified as POC maturity because it demonstrates the attack path and command execution primitive rather than providing a generalized exploitation framework.
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No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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