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Sliver is a command and control framework that uses a custom Wireguard netstack. Prior to version 1.7.4, a single click on a malicious link gives an unauthenticated attacker immediate, silent control over every active C2 session or beacon, capable of exfiltrating all collected target data (e.g. SSH keys, ntds.dit) or destroying the entire compromised infrastructure, entirely through the operator's own browser. This issue has been patched in version 1.7.4.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small, self-contained browser-based exploit PoC for an unauthenticated Sliver MCP interface exposure combined with a CORS bypass condition. It contains two files: a README describing the issue and linking to the advisory, and a single code file, poc.ts, which is actually an HTML document with embedded JavaScript and CSS rather than TypeScript source. The exploit's purpose is to demonstrate cross-site interaction with a locally running Sliver MCP server from a malicious webpage visited by an operator. The code listens to an SSE stream, parses event data as a URL, extracts a sessionId query parameter, and then sends a JSON-RPC POST request using fetch() with mode set to no-cors and Content-Type set to text/plain. This is intended to qualify as a simple request and avoid browser preflight checks, matching the README's claim that the underlying MCP implementation does not validate Content-Type. After dispatching the POST, the PoC waits for the resulting data to appear back on the GET/SSE stream, effectively exfiltrating Sliver session and beacon information. Repository structure is minimal: README.md provides vulnerability context; poc.ts is the main exploit entry point and contains all UI, logging, SSE handling, session theft logic, and payload delivery logic. No external framework is used. The exploit is operational rather than a mere detection script because it actively issues a tool invocation against the target service and is designed to retrieve sensitive operator-side C2 data.
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