Loading vulnerability…
CVE-2026-34474 is an unauthenticated sensitive information exposure vulnerability affecting ZTE ZXHN H298A 1.1 and ZTE ZXHN H108N 2.6 routers. A crafted HTTP GET request to the router web management interface can cause the device to return sensitive configuration and account data in plaintext HTML. Reported exposed values include the live administrator password, the WLAN pre-shared key, and the SSID; some firmware variants may additionally expose device-identifying information such as the serial number, or may expose only partial identifiers. The flaw effectively discloses secrets that should never be retrievable without authorization and indicates insufficient access control on diagnostic or hidden web interface functionality.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository is a small standalone disclosure and PoC package for CVE-2026-34474 affecting ZTE ZXHN H298A 1.1 and H108N 2.6 routers. It is not part of a common exploit framework. The repo contains a public-facing static write-up site (index.html plus assets/site.css and assets/site.js), top-level documentation in README.md, and a poc/ directory with the actual Python proof-of-concept scripts and validation notes. The main exploit capability is unauthenticated sensitive data extraction from the router web interface. The primary script, poc/extract_ethcheat_credentials.py, reads targets from a local urls.txt file, sends HTTP GET requests to http://<target>/getpage.lua?pid=1000ÐCheat=1, and uses regex to extract the live administrator password (OBJ_USERINFO_IDPassword1), WLAN ESSID (WLANAP_ESSID1), and WLAN PSK (WLANPSK_KeyPassphrase1) from returned markup. It then queries http://<target>/wizard_page/wizard_overETHfail_set_lua.lua to extract the serial number. Results are printed in a colored table, and the script supports asynchronous processing of multiple targets. This makes the PoC operational rather than a mere detector because it directly recovers usable credentials. The secondary script, poc/check_serialnumber_endpoint.py, is a narrower helper that validates only the serial-number disclosure endpoint. It accepts a target host or base URL, constructs the URL for /wizard_page/wizard_overETHfail_set_lua.lua, performs a GET request with requests, and extracts the SerialNumber field from the response. Attack vector is web/network-based against exposed router management interfaces. The exploit does not deliver code execution or a shell payload; instead, its impact is credential disclosure leading to administrative access and Wi-Fi compromise. The repository overall is well aligned with its claim, includes supporting notes and tooling descriptions, and does not appear fake or malicious beyond the stated credential-extraction purpose.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
10 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.