CVE-2026-34626 is an improper control of object prototype attributes vulnerability in Adobe Acrobat and Reader. Affected versions include 26.001.21411 and earlier on the Continuous track, and 24.001.30360/24.001.30362 and earlier on the 2024 Classic track, on Windows and macOS. The flaw is described as a prototype pollution issue in privileged JavaScript workflows that trust attacker-influenced object properties where primitive string values are expected. Analysis associates the vulnerable behavior with trusted collaboration and sharing functions, including workflows such as ANShareFile, ANStartApproval, ANSendForApproval, ANSendForReview, ANSendForSharedReview, CBSharedReviewCompleteAutomation, ANSendForFormDistribution, and CBBBRInvite. In these paths, privileged code may operate on values such as doc.path and related properties without first validating that they are safe primitive strings, enabling attacker-controlled prototype behavior to influence privileged execution and produce arbitrary file system reads in the context of the current user. Exploitation requires the target to open a maliciously crafted PDF file.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small, self-contained research PoC for an Adobe Acrobat exploit chain centered on malicious PDF JavaScript execution and post-exploitation file theft. It contains 4 files: a Python PDF generator (CVE-2026-34621.py), a Python HTTP collection server (c2.py), the main Acrobat JavaScript payload (payload_steal.js), and documentation (ReadMe.md). The main exploit flow is: the operator embeds payload_steal.js into a PDF using CVE-2026-34621.py; the generated PDF sets /OpenAction to a JavaScript action so code runs when the document is opened; the JavaScript then abuses Acrobat-specific internal functions and trust mechanisms to obtain privileged execution; finally it reads a local Windows file and exfiltrates it over HTTP in chunks. CVE-2026-34621.py is not itself the vulnerability trigger beyond embedding arbitrary JavaScript into a PDF. It is a helper utility that reads an external JS file, escapes it for PDF syntax, and writes a minimal PDF object structure with /OpenAction pointing to a /JavaScript action. This makes it the delivery builder for the exploit document. payload_steal.js contains the actual exploit logic. It defines a privileged file-stealing routine using app.beginPriv(), util.readFileIntoStream(), and app.launchURL(). It hardcodes the victim file path /C/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts and exfiltrates the resulting hex data to http://192.168.56.1:45191/exfil. The script also contains the exploit chain primitives described in the README: injection through ANFancyAlertImpl with a crafted button key, prototype pollution using Object.prototype.__defineGetter__('swConn', ...), trusted function registration via app.trustedFunction.bind, fake object methods for path processing, and invocation of ANShareFile/SilentDocCenterLogin to redirect privileged workflow execution. c2.py is a simple operational support component rather than the exploit itself. It listens on 0.0.0.0:45191, accepts GET requests to /exfil, reconstructs chunked hex data into binary, and saves recovered files under exfiltrated_files/. It prints progress and validates whether the recovered file begins with a PDF header. Overall, this is a real exploit PoC repository rather than a detector. It demonstrates a file-based attack vector against vulnerable Adobe Acrobat Reader environments, with a hardcoded but functional payload and a matching receiver, making it operational rather than a bare conceptual proof.
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Уязвимость prototype pollution/type confusion в Adobe Acrobat/Reader, позволяющая через подмену методов объекта добиться произвольного чтения файловой системы из привилегированного контекста.
A likely CVE assignment for a use-after-free remote code execution vulnerability in Adobe Acrobat Reader's Escript.api module caused by improper handling of property accessor definitions and desynchronization between reference counting and the event scope stack.
A related authenticated privilege escalation vulnerability affecting the same Frontend Admin by DynamiApps plugin.
A prototype pollution-related Adobe Acrobat/Reader vulnerability addressed in the second emergency update. The analysis links it to a security fix involving object confusion through trusted string-processing sinks such as doc.path or related variants, but states the exact CVE-to-patch mapping is unclear.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.