CVE-2026-35333 is a vulnerability in libradius affecting the processing of RADIUS attributes. According to the provided context, malformed or otherwise crafted RADIUS attributes can trigger either an infinite loop condition or an out-of-bounds read during attribute parsing. The out-of-bounds read may lead to process instability or a crash. Specific vulnerable functions, affected versions, and protocol field details are not available in the provided information.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository is a small standalone Python proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-35333, a pre-authentication remote denial-of-service issue in strongSwan's RADIUS handling. The repo contains only three files: a GPLv3 LICENSE, a README describing the bug and usage, and `poc.py`, the actual exploit. The exploit is not part of a larger framework. `poc.py` is the sole code file and the clear entry point. It builds a minimal malformed RADIUS Access-Request packet and sends it over UDP to a target strongSwan charon DAE listener, defaulting to `127.0.0.1:3799`. The malicious packet contains a first attribute with `length = 0`, which abuses the vulnerable `attribute_enumerate()` logic described in the README. According to the included explanation, strongSwan's DAE receive path calls `verify()` before dispatching on RADIUS code, and for Access-Request packets the verification path skips the Response-Authenticator MD5 check and walks the attribute list directly. Because the malformed zero-length attribute causes the iterator state not to advance, the parser loops forever. This means the attack is unauthenticated and only requires network access to the UDP/3799 listener. The exploit's main capability is remote CPU exhaustion / worker-thread starvation. One crafted packet is intended to pin one charon worker thread at 100% CPU indefinitely; sending multiple packets via the `--count` option can exhaust all available worker threads and produce a full denial of service. The script also includes a benign control path (`--control`) that sends a well-formed Disconnect-Request with a User-Name attribute to demonstrate expected non-hanging rejection behavior when the packet is merely unsigned rather than malformed. Structurally, the code is straightforward: helper functions construct either the malformed Access-Request or a valid control Disconnect-Request, `send_packet()` transmits the packet via a UDP socket and waits briefly for a response, and `main()` parses CLI arguments (`--target`, `--port`, `--count`, `--wait`, `--control`) and orchestrates repeated sends. There is no shell payload, persistence, post-exploitation logic, or credential theft; the repository is focused purely on demonstrating and operationalizing the network DoS condition against vulnerable strongSwan deployments.
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