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CVE-2026-36356 is an unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability in the GoAhead web server component exposed by MeiG Smart FORGE_SLT711 devices running firmware MDM9607.LE.1.0-00110-STD.PROD-1. The flaw is reachable via the /action/SetRemoteAccessCfg endpoint and allows attacker-controlled input to be interpreted by the underlying operating system command context. The available reporting indicates the vulnerable functionality is exposed remotely over the network and does not require authentication or user interaction. The CVE record also notes CWE-306 in addition to CWE-78, indicating the affected endpoint performs a critical function without authentication.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository is a small standalone exploit PoC for CVE-2026-36356. It contains one executable Python script (poc_rce.py), a README advisory with vulnerability details and curl examples, plus license and gitignore files. The exploit is not part of a larger framework. The core capability is unauthenticated blind remote code execution against MeiG Smart FORGE_SLT711 4G LTE CPE devices running vulnerable firmware. The Python script sends an HTTP POST request to /action/SetRemoteAccessCfg with a JSON body whose password field contains shell command substitution syntax $(...). According to the advisory, the target firmware inserts this value into a shell command of the form echo root:"%s"|chpasswd and executes it with system(), allowing arbitrary command execution as uid 0/root. Operationally, the script accepts --ip, --port, --cmd, and --timeout arguments, defaults to 192.168.1.1:80, and treats success as a JSON response containing retcode equal to 0. Because the exploit is blind, command output is not returned in the HTTP response; the README recommends redirecting output to a file such as /tmp/out or starting a telnet daemon (telnetd -l /bin/sh) for interactive access. This makes the PoC more than a simple detector: it actively delivers a command payload and can establish follow-on shell access. Repository structure is minimal and purpose-built: README.md documents the vulnerability, affected product, root cause, and exploitation examples; poc_rce.py implements the exploit logic; LICENSE and .gitignore are ancillary. Overall, this is a genuine operational PoC for unauthenticated web-based RCE on a specific router family.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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