CVE-2026-36590 is a denial-of-service vulnerability in EMQ NanoMQ 0.24.9. The issue is associated with the nni_qos_db_set function in the broker_tcp.c component. A remote attacker can trigger the flaw by interacting with the vulnerable network-exposed service, causing the broker to become unavailable. Specific root-cause details beyond the affected function and component are not currently available.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a proof-of-concept and research package for CVE-2026-36590, a NanoMQ denial-of-service issue caused by a memory leak in MQTT QoS handling. The main exploit logic is in 249exploit_leak.py, a Python script that opens raw TCP connections to an MQTT broker on port 1883 and sends hardcoded MQTT packet sequences. One thread acts as a subscriber and keeps the connection open; a second client publishes a QoS>0 message. Repeating this interaction triggers the vulnerable persistence path and leaks message objects, leading to memory exhaustion. Repository structure: the root contains the primary PoC (249exploit_leak.py), NanoMQ configuration (nanomq.conf), ASan/runtime evidence logs, a README advisory, and a detailed technical analysis report. The Docker/ directory contains a reproducible lab environment: a Dockerfile that clones/builds NanoMQ with ASan, a matching nanomq.conf, and duplicate PoCs for versions 0.24.6 and 0.24.9. The included markdown explains how to build and run the vulnerable environment. Exploit capability: remote unauthenticated network DoS against exposed NanoMQ MQTT listeners, assuming anonymous access and the specific misconfiguration/build mismatch described by the repo. No RCE or shell payload is present. The code is a real exploit PoC, not merely a detector, and its output is validation of the leak/DoS condition through broker behavior and ASan leak reports.
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