Loading vulnerability…
CVE-2026-37071 is an arbitrary file rename vulnerability in the Actions::renameFile() function of Veno File Manager Project 4.4.9. An authenticated user granted rename permission can submit a crafted POST request that renames the application's configuration file. When the application subsequently rebuilds its configuration, it resets the super-administrator credentials to default values, allowing the attacker to take over that account.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small, focused proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-37071 affecting Veno File Manager 4.4.9. It contains two files: a Bash exploit script (PoC.sh) and a README describing the vulnerability. The exploit is not part of a larger framework. The main capability is authenticated web-based privilege escalation via arbitrary file rename. The script uses curl to send a crafted POST request to the target VFM installation root while supplying a valid session cookie. It targets the application's rename functionality by specifying the directory vfm-admin/, extension php, the base64-encoded original filename 'config', and a replacement name 'anything'. By renaming the effective config file (vfm-admin/config.php), the exploit causes the application to behave as though it is being initialized for the first time. According to the script comments and README, this rebuild regenerates configuration and users data, resetting the super administrator account to default credentials. Repository structure is minimal: README.md documents the issue and impact, while PoC.sh is the operational exploit entry point. There is no detection logic, persistence, or post-exploitation automation beyond printing the expected default credentials (admin/password). Because it includes a working exploitation request and a concrete privilege-escalation outcome, it is best classified as an operational PoC rather than a mere detection script.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.