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CVE-2026-39816 is an authorization-bypass vulnerability in Apache NiFi 2.0.0-M1 through 2.8.0. The optional TinkerpopClientService lacks the Restricted annotation requiring the Execute Code permission. A user who is not authorized to execute code can configure the service for bytecode submission and provide a Groovy graph query. The graph-query execution path compiles and evaluates the Groovy input locally before submitting the graph traversal, bypassing NiFi's intended Execute Code authorization boundary.
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This 34-file repository is a multi-CVE offensive research collection for Keycloak, Apache NiFi, HashiCorp Vault, and HashiCorp Nomad. It contains four standalone Python PoCs under exploits/, three corresponding Metasploit modules under metasploit-custom-modules/, module documentation, and four deliberately vulnerable Docker labs under docker-lab/. The Metasploit modules provide reusable Keycloak account takeover, Vault secret disclosure, and NiFi command/reverse-shell exploitation; Nomad is supplied as a standalone PoC only. The labs bind their primary services to localhost and intentionally use vulnerable versions: Keycloak 26.7.1, NiFi 2.8.0 with graph NARs and Keycloak OIDC, Vault 2.0.3 dev mode, and Nomad 2.0.0 with a privileged nested Docker/client setup. Notable implementation issue: exploits/nifi_rce_39816.py imports nifi_oidc from a repository-root configs directory, but the supplied nifi_oidc.py is actually located in docker-lab/nifi-cve-2026-39816/setup/; absent an external configs/nifi_oidc.py, that standalone script will fail at import time. The equivalent Metasploit NiFi module contains its own OIDC implementation and is not affected by this path mismatch.
Repository contains a working proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-39816 against Apache NiFi 2.8.0. The main exploit is pocs/flow_designer_groovy_rce.py, a standalone Python script that authenticates to the NiFi REST API, verifies that the low-privileged user lacks access to restricted scripting processors, then abuses the unrestricted ExecuteGraphQuery/TinkerpopClientService path to execute attacker-supplied Groovy in the NiFi JVM. Its practical payload is a reverse shell callback to the operator, followed by PTY upgrade and interactive terminal handling. This is not merely a detector; it performs end-to-end exploitation and cleanup. Repository structure is split between the exploit and a reproducible lab environment. The setup/ directory provisions a Docker Compose stack with Apache NiFi 2.8.0, OpenLDAP, and a Gremlin server. Supporting files configure LDAP-backed authentication and NiFi authorization, seed two users (admin and flow_designer), patch NiFi properties, and automate startup/teardown. setup.sh also downloads the required graph bundle NARs from Maven Central and configures policies so flow_designer has flow-editing rights but not EXECUTE_CODE, matching the intended bypass scenario. Primary attack vector is web/network-based via authenticated HTTPS access to NiFi's /nifi-api endpoints. The exploit depends on the optional graph bundle being installed and on the attacker having sufficient design permissions to create controller services/processors. Fingerprintable infrastructure includes the NiFi API at /nifi-api/access/token and /flow/process-groups/root, LDAP at ldap://ldap:389, Gremlin at gremlin-server:8182 / ws://gremlin-server:8182/gremlin, Maven Central for NAR downloads, and the reverse-shell callback target host.docker.internal:9998. Overall, this repository is a realistic operational POC demonstrating privilege-boundary bypass leading to arbitrary code execution as the NiFi service account.
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An authorization-bypass remote code execution vulnerability in Apache NiFi's TinkerpopClientService and ExecuteGraphQuery/ExecuteGraphQueryRecord processors. A user with process-group and controller read/write permissions, but explicitly denied Execute Code, can submit Groovy that is compiled and executed by the local GremlinGroovyScriptEngine as the NiFi service account.
A high-severity Apache NiFi vulnerability caused by a missing restricted annotation for the Execute Code Required Permission, allowing users without EXECUTE_CODE permission to configure TinkerpopClientService to execute Groovy code when the optional graph services extension is installed.
A high-severity authenticated arbitrary code execution vulnerability in Apache NiFi that allows users lacking the EXECUTE_CODE privilege to run Groovy code on the NiFi server via graph query functionality when optional graph-related extensions, including nifi-other-graph-services-nar, are installed.
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