CVE-2026-39842 affects OpenRemote 1.21.0 and earlier and consists of two related expression injection flaws in the rules engine that permit arbitrary server-side code execution. In the JavaScript rules engine, user-supplied rule scripts are executed through Nashorn ScriptEngine.eval() without sandboxing, class filtering, or other access restrictions. In parallel, the authorization logic in RulesResourceImpl restricts Groovy rule creation to superusers but leaves JavaScript rules available to any user holding the write:rules role. Separately, the Groovy rules engine includes a GroovyDenyAllFilter, but the filter is never registered because the registration code is commented out, which leaves the intended SandboxTransformer protections ineffective for superuser-created Groovy rules. As a result, an attacker able to create JavaScript rules can execute arbitrary code with full JVM access on the OpenRemote server.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a small, focused exploit set for CVE-2026-39842 against OpenRemote Rules Engine. Structure: one README with vulnerability write-up and usage guidance, one Python detector, one Python exploit PoC, and one Nmap NSE detector. Languages are Python, Lua, and Markdown. Main exploit capability is in exploit_openremote.py. It is an authenticated web/network RCE PoC targeting OpenRemote <= 1.21.0. The script logs into OpenRemote’s Keycloak endpoint using username/password and client_id=openremote, checks version via /api/master/info, then abuses the rules API by creating a JavaScript ruleset at /api/{realm}/rules/realm. The payload relies on Nashorn JavaScript access to Java.type()/Runtime.exec(), yielding command execution as root. The CLI exposes practical modes for whoami/id checks, arbitrary command execution, file reads, and environment-variable dumping, and includes optional cleanup of the malicious ruleset. The repository also includes two detection components. detect_openremote.py is a standalone Python scanner that fingerprints OpenRemote via /api/master/info and the main page, extracts version information, and checks rules API accessibility to determine likely vulnerability status. openremote-detect.nse is an Nmap NSE vulnerability detection script that performs similar safe checks and reports VULN/NOT_VULN/LIKELY_VULN states. Because this is an NSE-based repository component, framework identification is set to nmap_nse, but the repo is not solely a framework module; it also contains standalone Python code. Fingerprintable targets and endpoints center on OpenRemote web APIs: /api/master/info, /api/master/rules/realm, /api/{realm}/rules/realm, /api/{realm}/rules/asset, and /auth/realms/{realm}/protocol/openid-connect/token. Example sensitive file targets include /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow. Overall, this is a legitimate exploit repository combining safe detection and an authenticated operational PoC for server-side RCE.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
3 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.