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CVE-2026-40083 is an SQL injection vulnerability in Cacti 1.2.30 and earlier in the SNMP agent manager deletion workflow. The application deserializes the selected graph array using cacti_unserialize(), then incorporates the resulting array values into a DELETE query through implode() without integer validation. Although object deserialization is disabled, attacker-controlled string-array elements can alter the constructed SQL statement.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a working proof-of-concept exploit and a local Dockerized lab for an authenticated SQL injection in Cacti managers.php, identified as CVE-2026-40083. The main exploit is exploit/poc.py, a Python script that uses requests to authenticate to Cacti, scrape CSRF tokens, create a temporary SNMP manager object, and exploit the selected_graphs_array PHP-serialized parameter in POST /managers.php using time-based blind SQL injection. Its primary capability is database extraction: it can verify the injection, enumerate user IDs, dump usernames and password hashes from the user_auth table, or extract arbitrary SQL query results. The exploit appears operational rather than framework-integrated, with built-in session handling, calibration for timing thresholds, optional proxy support, and cleanup logic to remove the created manager entry. Repository structure is small and purpose-built: README.md documents the vulnerability, usage, impact, and lab instructions; exploit/poc.py is the main exploit implementation; templates/CVE-2026-40083.yaml is a Nuclei-style detection template for identifying vulnerable instances and confirming the timing issue; Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml, and entrypoint.sh build a reproducible vulnerable Cacti environment backed by MySQL for testing. The Docker lab exposes Cacti on localhost:8088 and initializes the application automatically. The exploit targets authenticated web access to Cacti <= 1.2.30 and requires privileges sufficient to use SNMP Manager functionality. It is not merely a detector: it actively exploits the flaw to retrieve sensitive database contents. The included YAML template, however, serves as a detection/check artifact separate from the Python exploit.
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