CVE-2026-40453 is an incomplete fix for CVE-2025-27636 in Apache Camel non-HTTP header filtering. The JmsHeaderFilterStrategy, ClassicJmsHeaderFilterStrategy, SjmsHeaderFilterStrategy, CoAPHeaderFilterStrategy, and GooglePubsubHeaderFilterStrategy implementations perform case-sensitive filtering of Camel-internal header prefixes, while Camel Exchange headers are maintained in a case-insensitive map. Consequently, a case-variant form of an internal header can bypass inbound filtering and subsequently be resolved under its canonical form by downstream Camel components. Affected versions are Apache Camel 3.0.0 through versions before 4.14.6, 4.15.0 through versions before 4.18.2, and 4.19.0 through versions before 4.20.0.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a functional Java/Spring Boot proof-of-concept reproducer for CVE-2026-40453 in Apache Camel. It is not just documentation: it contains a runnable vulnerable route, a bundled attacker client, Docker packaging, and clear exploit paths. The exploit demonstrates that Camel non-HTTP header filter strategies can be bypassed with case-variant Camel* header names because filtering is case-sensitive while the Camel Exchange header map is case-insensitive. Repository structure: Application.java is the Spring Boot entry point. CoapExecRoute.java defines the vulnerable Camel route from coap://0.0.0.0:5683/run to exec:echo?args=hello, making camel-exec the RCE sink. ExploitController.java exposes HTTP helper endpoints under /exploit that send CoAP requests to the local route: /normal sends no injected headers, /canonical sends CamelExecCommandExecutable and CamelExecCommandArgs as a control case, and /attack sends the bypass payload using CAmelExecCommandExecutable and CAmelExecCommandArgs. application.properties sets server.port=8080. Dockerfile and docker-compose.yml package and expose the app. Main exploit capability: remote command execution through header injection. The attack works by supplying CoAP URI query parameters that become Camel headers. Canonical CamelExecCommand* headers are filtered, but case-variant forms such as CAmelExecCommandExecutable bypass the vulnerable CoAPHeaderFilterStrategy and are later resolved by camel-exec under the canonical header names. In this PoC, the payload changes the executed command to /usr/bin/touch /tmp/pwned, proving code execution inside the container. The repository also demonstrates the negative case where /tmp/pwned-canonical should not be created. Operationally, this is an exploit reproducer rather than a generalized weaponized tool. It requires a vulnerable Camel deployment pattern: an untrusted producer (here camel-coap) feeding a header-sensitive downstream component (here camel-exec). The code is concise, self-contained, and purpose-built to validate the vulnerability and show exploitability.
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A related Apache Camel non-HTTP header-filter strategy vulnerability cited for comparison.
One of multiple Apache Camel vulnerabilities affecting SAP Integration Suite Edge Integration Cell.
One of multiple Apache Camel vulnerabilities affecting SAP Integration Suite Edge Integration Cell.
One of multiple Apache Camel vulnerabilities in SAP Integration Suite Edge Integration Cell affecting message-based header injection and/or deserialization mechanisms.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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