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CVE-2026-40466 is an authenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Apache ActiveMQ that bypasses the earlier fix for CVE-2026-34197. The flaw affects Apache ActiveMQ Broker, Apache ActiveMQ All, and Apache ActiveMQ before 5.19.6, and versions 6.0.0 through 6.2.4. An authenticated attacker can add a connector through Jolokia using BrokerView.addNetworkConnector or BrokerView.addConnector with an HTTP Discovery transport when the activemq-http module is present on the classpath. A malicious HTTP endpoint can then supply a VM transport URI as a second-stage response, bypassing the validation introduced for CVE-2026-34197. The attacker can abuse the VM transport brokerConfig parameter to load a remote Spring XML application context via ResourceXmlApplicationContext. Because Spring instantiates singleton beans before BrokerService completes configuration validation, attacker-controlled bean definitions can trigger arbitrary code execution on the broker JVM, including through bean factory methods such as Runtime.exec().
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a standalone Java Swing exploit toolkit for Apache ActiveMQ, not a Metasploit/Nuclei module. The project is Maven-based, with a single executable entry point in src/main/java/cc/kiiy/App.java that launches a GUI (MainFrame). The codebase is organized into service classes for exploitation/detection logic (EnvironmentService, VulnerabilityService), UI panels for each supported CVE and settings, and utility helpers for HTTP and local config handling. Core capability-wise, the tool supports both detection and exploitation. EnvironmentService fingerprints ActiveMQ by requesting the target URL and checking for the Apache ActiveMQ title, and can authenticate to /admin/ using HTTP Basic auth to extract hostname, version, and uptime from the admin console HTML. VulnerabilityService is the main exploit engine. For CVE-2015-5254, it accepts a user-provided Base64 serialized payload, decodes it, wraps it into an ActiveMQObjectMessage, and sends it over OpenWire/JMS to a chosen queue on tcp://<host>:<port> (default 61616), enabling broker-side deserialization when the message is processed/viewed. For CVE-2016-3088, it performs a PUT to /fileserver/<random>.txt and then a MOVE to file:///etc/cron.d/root, planting a cron entry that launches a Perl reverse shell back to the operator. This is a real exploitation path, not just a detector, but it depends on vulnerable behavior and elevated target privileges. The repository also includes support for CVE-2022-41678 workflows. Although the provided content truncates some of the implementation, the UI and service references clearly show functionality to write a default or custom webshell and then execute commands through it, with selectable methods such as auto, log4j2, and jfr. The included JfrTemplate.java contains a large embedded JFR configuration template, indicating one exploitation path abuses JFR-related file write/config behavior. BeanXmlPanel generates Spring BeanXML payloads using java.lang.ProcessBuilder for arbitrary command execution, likely intended to support XML-based ActiveMQ exploitation such as CVE-2023-46604-style xbean loading. The code also contains logic for a Jolokia-based probe labeled CVE-2026-34197 that sends an addNetworkConnector request with a vm://evil?brokerConfig=xbean:<xmlServer> argument, causing the target to fetch attacker-controlled XML from an external server. Network and fingerprintable artifacts are abundant: HTTP(S) access to the target web console and admin paths, OpenWire TCP access to port 61616, PUT/MOVE requests to /fileserver/, file destinations like file:///etc/cron.d/root, attacker XML hosting URLs, and Basic Authorization headers. The GUI exposes global custom headers and proxy settings, allowing the operator to tune requests and route traffic through a local proxy. Overall, this is an operational multi-CVE ActiveMQ exploitation toolkit with a GUI front end, combining reconnaissance, authenticated checks, payload generation, deserialization delivery, arbitrary file write abuse, XML-based RCE testing, and webshell management.
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15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.