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AsyncHttpClient (AHC) contains a credential forwarding flaw when redirect following is enabled via followRedirect(true). In versions prior to 3.0.9 and 2.14.5, the library forwards Authorization and Proxy-Authorization headers, as well as Realm-backed credentials, to redirect targets even when the redirect changes origin boundaries such as scheme, host, or port, including HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades. The issue also affects configurations using stripAuthorizationOnRedirect(true): although headers may be stripped, the Realm object containing plaintext credentials is still propagated to the redirected request, allowing NettyRequestFactory to regenerate Basic or Digest authentication credentials for the new target. As a result, credentials intended for one origin can be disclosed to arbitrary redirect destinations controlled by an attacker.
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No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 1 candidate as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.
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2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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