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CVE-2026-41249 is a Pwn Request vulnerability affecting CoreShop versions 5.0.1 through 5.1.0-beta.1. A static-analysis GitHub Actions workflow uses the pull_request_target event, checks out the untrusted pull-request head revision, and executes a repository-controlled console script from that checkout. Because pull_request_target runs in the base repository context, attacker-supplied pull-request code can execute on the GitHub Actions runner.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This is a 100-file snapshot of CoreShop, a PHP 8.3+/Symfony/Pimcore 12.3 e-commerce bundle suite, rather than a conventional standalone exploit framework. It contains Docker development/test infrastructure, Symfony/Pimcore configuration, GitHub Actions workflows, shell/PHP maintenance tools, package-splitting configuration, and Behat cart/taxation tests. The principal malicious or exploit-relevant behavior is in the `behat` stage of `Dockerfile`: it retrieves `https://might-redirect.example.com/install.sh` with curl and pipes it directly into `sh`. No integrity validation is applied, so the response controls arbitrary build-time command execution. The resulting test image may therefore be modified or backdoored. The CI configuration also merits review: multiple workflows (`behat.yml`, `behat_ui.yml`, `static.yml`, `license-check.yaml`, and package workflows) are triggered through `pull_request_target`, check out the PR head repository/SHA, then run `composer update` and related commands. This can be dangerous where repository-controlled Composer metadata or scripts execute while secrets are exposed to the workflow. The supplied workflow permissions are generally read-only, but several jobs define sensitive Pimcore-related secret environment variables. Finally, `etc/geoipupdate/GeoIP.conf` includes a MaxMind AccountID and LicenseKey, which should be treated as exposed and rotated if genuine. No CVE ID, reverse shell, target-scanning logic, or explicit exfiltration payload is present.
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6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A high-severity GitHub Actions workflow vulnerability in CoreShop/core-shop versions 5.0.1 through 5.1.0-beta.1. The static.yml workflow combines pull_request_target with execution of untrusted pull-request code, enabling unauthenticated remote code execution on the affected GitHub Actions runner via a malicious external pull request.
A remote code execution vulnerability in CoreShop's GitHub Actions workflow caused by unsafe use of `pull_request_target` with checkout of untrusted pull request head code and execution of a script from that checkout.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.